{
  "guides": [
    {
      "slug": "intake",
      "name": "Scope and intake",
      "category": "Research",
      "summary": "Turn a broad request into a bounded review plan with recorded ownership, constraints, and evidence goals.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Written program scope and rules",
        "Approved test accounts or environments",
        "Known application entry points"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Record the boundary",
          "body": "List approved hosts, applications, accounts, and data classes before opening a review. Mark excluded systems and actions beside them."
        },
        {
          "title": "Model the actors",
          "body": "Describe the roles, tenants, and protected objects that the product is expected to keep separate."
        },
        {
          "title": "Choose safe evidence",
          "body": "Define the smallest observation that can confirm or reject each security assumption using owned data."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "A scope record",
        "A role and object map",
        "A bounded evidence plan"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Treating a discovered hostname as authorization",
        "Mixing assumptions with observed facts",
        "Collecting more data than the review needs"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "owasp-threat-modeling-assumptions-and-validation",
            "title": "OWASP Threat Modeling: system assumptions and mitigation validation",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-threat-modeling-assumptions-and-validation/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-secure-code-review-methodology",
            "title": "OWASP Secure Code Review: baseline and change-focused review",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-secure-code-review-methodology/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [],
        "reports": []
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/intake/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/intake/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "access-control",
      "name": "Access control and tenant boundaries",
      "category": "Identity",
      "summary": "Review whether every protected operation binds the caller, tenant, resource, and action together at the decision point.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Authorization policy or role matrix",
        "Two approved tenant or role contexts",
        "Owned example resources"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Write the invariant",
          "body": "State who may perform which action on which resource in which tenant; include inherited and combined views."
        },
        {
          "title": "Trace enforcement",
          "body": "Follow each server-side route, resolver, or service call to the authorization decision and note alternate interfaces."
        },
        {
          "title": "Check stale authority",
          "body": "Review exports, pagination, saved views, and cached references for a fresh permission decision before disclosure."
        },
        {
          "title": "Preserve evidence",
          "body": "Compare permitted and denied outcomes using only owned objects and record the expected policy result."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Authorization invariant table",
        "Enforcement trace",
        "Documented allow and deny evidence"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Relying on UI visibility as authorization",
        "Checking only one API path",
        "Forgetting tenant context on background work"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "owasp-authorization-cheat-sheet",
            "title": "Authorization Cheat Sheet",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-authorization-cheat-sheet/"
          },
          {
            "id": "nist-sp-800-162-attribute-authority-modeling",
            "title": "NIST SP 800-162: attribute authority and policy traceability",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/nist-sp-800-162-attribute-authority-modeling/"
          },
          {
            "id": "openfga-authorization-query-freshness",
            "title": "OpenFGA query consistency: authorization decisions need sufficiently fresh state",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/openfga-authorization-query-freshness/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "combined-view-source-authorization",
            "title": "Combined views preserve every source's access boundary",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/combined-view-source-authorization/"
          },
          {
            "id": "fallback-requester-authorization",
            "title": "Fallbacks must preserve the original caller's authority",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/fallback-requester-authorization/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "github-cross-repository-comparison-authorization-2025",
            "title": "GitHub comparison output lacked source-repository authorization",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/github-cross-repository-comparison-authorization-2025/"
          },
          {
            "id": "instagram-embedding-privileged-fallback-2023",
            "title": "Instagram embedding fallback changed the authorization context",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/instagram-embedding-privileged-fallback-2023/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/access-control/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/access-control/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "session",
      "name": "Session, cookies, and passkeys",
      "category": "Identity",
      "summary": "Assess session issuance, recovery, revocation, and privilege changes as one continuous account-authority lifecycle.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Session and cookie configuration",
        "Recovery and logout flows",
        "Approved browser sessions"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Inventory authority",
          "body": "Identify the server-recognized session, its binding attributes, expiry, rotation, and the events that should revoke it."
        },
        {
          "title": "Map transitions",
          "body": "Review login, recovery, credential change, role change, and logout for consistent reauthentication and invalidation rules."
        },
        {
          "title": "Check parallel state",
          "body": "Confirm the same revocation rules reach browser sessions, APIs, and persistent connections."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review recovery proof",
          "body": "Ensure account recovery establishes ownership without leaving older authority usable."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Session lifecycle map",
        "Revocation expectations",
        "Recovery control notes"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Treating logout as a client-only event",
        "Ignoring active sessions after recovery",
        "Confusing encryption with token authenticity"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "owasp-session-privilege-transition-integrity",
            "title": "OWASP Session Management: privilege-transition integrity",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-session-privilege-transition-integrity/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-account-recovery-state-integrity",
            "title": "OWASP Forgot Password",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-account-recovery-state-integrity/"
          },
          {
            "id": "usenix-2026-passkey-remediation-authority-lifecycle",
            "title": "Adversarial passkeys: account recovery must close every continuing source of authority",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/usenix-2026-passkey-remediation-authority-lifecycle/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "account-recovery-challenge-lifecycle",
            "title": "Recovery must preserve account ownership",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/account-recovery-challenge-lifecycle/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "gitlab-recovery-address-binding-cve-2023-7028",
            "title": "GitLab recovery delivery lacked verified-address binding",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/gitlab-recovery-address-binding-cve-2023-7028/"
          },
          {
            "id": "microsoft-account-recovery-rate-limit-consistency-2021",
            "title": "Microsoft account recovery lacked consistent attempt-limit enforcement",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/microsoft-account-recovery-rate-limit-consistency-2021/"
          },
          {
            "id": "instagram-recovery-challenge-account-binding-2019",
            "title": "Instagram recovery challenges were insufficiently bound to accounts",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/instagram-recovery-challenge-account-binding-2019/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/session/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/session/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "oauth",
      "name": "OAuth, DPoP, and mix-up",
      "category": "Identity",
      "summary": "Review delegated identity and token flows for strict issuer, client, redirect, audience, and grant binding.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Authorization-server metadata",
        "Registered client configuration",
        "Documented callback and token handling"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Map each binding",
          "body": "Document issuer, client, redirect destination, state, nonce, code verifier, audience, and subject binding for the intended flow."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review callback decisions",
          "body": "Confirm successful and error responses apply the same registered redirect and state validation."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review token acceptance",
          "body": "Ensure the relying service validates issuer, audience, signature, expiry, and the grant context before account mapping."
        },
        {
          "title": "Check renewal boundaries",
          "body": "Confirm refreshed authority stays within the original approved resource and consent scope."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Grant binding map",
        "Callback validation checklist",
        "Token validation contract"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Accepting a claim without provenance",
        "Validating only success redirects",
        "Letting refresh expand resource authority"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "rfc-9700-oauth-security-best-current-practice",
            "title": "RFC 9700: Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/rfc-9700-oauth-security-best-current-practice/"
          },
          {
            "id": "rfc-10017-browser-oauth-token-custody",
            "title": "RFC 10017: OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Applications",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/rfc-10017-browser-oauth-token-custody/"
          },
          {
            "id": "n8n-2026-refresh-grant-resource-binding",
            "title": "n8n: refreshed authority must remain bound to the consented resource",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/n8n-2026-refresh-grant-resource-binding/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "identity-claim-binding",
            "title": "An identity claim must belong to the user",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/identity-claim-binding/"
          },
          {
            "id": "delegated-grant-authority-continuity",
            "title": "Delegated authority stays within the approved grant",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/delegated-grant-authority-continuity/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "apple-sign-in-identity-claim-binding-2020",
            "title": "Sign in with Apple failed to bind identity claims to the authenticated user",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/apple-sign-in-identity-claim-binding-2020/"
          },
          {
            "id": "github-oauth-method-semantics-2019",
            "title": "GitHub OAuth consent failed across request-method semantics",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/github-oauth-method-semantics-2019/"
          },
          {
            "id": "google-device-authorization-client-scope-binding-2026",
            "title": "Google device grants lost client and permission binding",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-device-authorization-client-scope-binding-2026/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/oauth/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/oauth/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "graphql",
      "name": "GraphQL APIs",
      "category": "Application",
      "summary": "Treat each GraphQL operation, resolver, and returned field as a separate server-side authorization and disclosure decision.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Schema and operation definitions",
        "Resolver or service authorization design",
        "Approved role contexts"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Classify operations",
          "body": "Group queries, mutations, subscriptions, batch operations, and persisted operations by the resources they read or change."
        },
        {
          "title": "Trace resolver authority",
          "body": "Verify each resolver forwards caller and tenant context to the service that owns the protected object."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review field disclosure",
          "body": "Check nested objects, fragments, errors, and connection edges for fields beyond the caller's policy."
        },
        {
          "title": "Contain exceptions",
          "body": "Ensure authorization failures stop execution and do not produce partial protected data."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Operation-to-resource map",
        "Resolver authorization trace",
        "Field disclosure review"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Assuming schema visibility grants access",
        "Skipping nested resolver checks",
        "Treating an error as harmless without reviewing its data"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "graphql-ruby-2026-authorization-exception-integrity",
            "title": "GraphQL-Ruby: authorization exceptions must stop execution",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/graphql-ruby-2026-authorization-exception-integrity/"
          },
          {
            "id": "microsoft-graph-batch-member-authorization-outcomes",
            "title": "Microsoft Graph batching: preserve each member authorization outcome",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/microsoft-graph-batch-member-authorization-outcomes/"
          },
          {
            "id": "google-aip-158-pagination-authorization-boundary",
            "title": "Google AIP-158: pagination continuation does not grant resource authority",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/google-aip-158-pagination-authorization-boundary/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "combined-view-source-authorization",
            "title": "Combined views preserve every source's access boundary",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/combined-view-source-authorization/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "github-cross-repository-comparison-authorization-2025",
            "title": "GitHub comparison output lacked source-repository authorization",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/github-cross-repository-comparison-authorization-2025/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/graphql/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/graphql/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "javascript",
      "name": "JavaScript and client trust",
      "category": "Application",
      "summary": "Review browser code as an untrusted-data consumer: preserve origin, context, serialization, and server-authorization boundaries.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Owned source or build artifacts",
        "Browser message contracts",
        "Content-security and rendering policy"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Map data contexts",
          "body": "Identify where server data, URLs, messages, and generated content enter HTML, script, navigation, or framework rendering contexts."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review message authority",
          "body": "Require an explicit sender origin, message shape, and allowed action before a listener changes state or reveals data."
        },
        {
          "title": "Check serialization",
          "body": "Ensure data remains data across server rendering, hydration, logs, and client components."
        },
        {
          "title": "Keep authorization server-side",
          "body": "Confirm browser controls do not substitute for a server decision about protected resources."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Source-to-context map",
        "Message contract review",
        "Rendering control notes"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Treating client checks as access control",
        "Using generic sanitization without knowing the output context",
        "Trusting all same-window messages"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "owasp-browser-message-trust-boundaries",
            "title": "HTML5 Security Cheat Sheet: Web Messaging",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-browser-message-trust-boundaries/"
          },
          {
            "id": "nextjs-server-client-data-security",
            "title": "Next.js data security: server authorization and client-visible data",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/nextjs-server-client-data-security/"
          },
          {
            "id": "w3c-2026-trusted-types-policy-authority",
            "title": "Trusted Types: typed sinks depend on trustworthy policy creation",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/w3c-2026-trusted-types-policy-authority/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "browser-message-authority-boundaries",
            "title": "Browser messages need separate trust checks",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/browser-message-authority-boundaries/"
          },
          {
            "id": "server-client-data-consumer-boundaries",
            "title": "Server disclosure and browser interpretation",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/server-client-data-consumer-boundaries/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "facebook-sdk-message-authentication-randomness-2023",
            "title": "Facebook SDK message authentication relied on insecure randomness",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/facebook-sdk-message-authentication-randomness-2023/"
          },
          {
            "id": "meta-pixel-cross-window-authority-binding-2024",
            "title": "Meta Pixel cross-window handling lost message and token authority",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/meta-pixel-cross-window-authority-binding-2024/"
          },
          {
            "id": "hackerone-report-json-serialization-data-exposure-2025",
            "title": "Framework serialization change exposed private HackerOne user attributes",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/hackerone-report-json-serialization-data-exposure-2025/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/javascript/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/javascript/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "cache",
      "name": "Cache deception and cache poisoning",
      "category": "Infrastructure",
      "summary": "Review cache keys, response eligibility, and invalidation so a response remains correct for the requester and representation that produced it.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Cache configuration",
        "Response headers and variation rules",
        "Authorization and tenant model"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Classify response data",
          "body": "Separate public, tenant-scoped, user-scoped, and diagnostic responses before deciding what may be stored."
        },
        {
          "title": "Trace the key",
          "body": "Document every request property that changes representation, permission, locale, or tenant and confirm it participates in cache selection."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review invalidation",
          "body": "Check privilege changes, logout, mutations, and deployment events for a safe freshness or purge strategy."
        },
        {
          "title": "Bound capacity",
          "body": "Ensure key cardinality and cache partitioning preserve availability without collapsing distinct security contexts."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Cache eligibility matrix",
        "Key and variation inventory",
        "Invalidation policy"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Caching personalized representations as public",
        "Forgetting authorization-affecting variation",
        "Assuming freshness implies authorization"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "arxiv-2026-cache-key-precision-and-capacity",
            "title": "Web cache key precision and capacity isolation",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/arxiv-2026-cache-key-precision-and-capacity/"
          },
          {
            "id": "nuxt-2026-rendered-payload-cache-authorization",
            "title": "Nuxt: rendered-data caches must preserve request authorization",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/nuxt-2026-rendered-payload-cache-authorization/"
          },
          {
            "id": "nextjs-2026-response-metadata-representation-boundary",
            "title": "Next.js: response metadata must preserve representation boundaries",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/nextjs-2026-response-metadata-representation-boundary/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "combined-view-source-authorization",
            "title": "Combined views preserve every source's access boundary",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/combined-view-source-authorization/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "github-cross-repository-comparison-authorization-2025",
            "title": "GitHub comparison output lacked source-repository authorization",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/github-cross-repository-comparison-authorization-2025/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/cache/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/cache/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "ai-agent",
      "name": "Agents, MCP, and retrieval",
      "category": "Identity",
      "summary": "Keep retrieved content, model output, tool authority, and user consent separate throughout an AI-assisted workflow.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Tool definitions and granted scopes",
        "Retrieval permissions and provenance metadata",
        "Human approval and audit requirements"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Model authority separately",
          "body": "Document what the model may suggest, what a tool may do, and which identity authorizes the tool invocation."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review retrieval boundaries",
          "body": "Require authorization and provenance checks before tenant or sensitive documents reach context."
        },
        {
          "title": "Validate before action",
          "body": "Make tools independently validate typed arguments, resource scope, and policy rather than trusting generated instructions."
        },
        {
          "title": "Make consent progressive",
          "body": "Present meaningful scope at approval time and retain an audit trail for sensitive operations."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Authority and consent map",
        "Retrieval boundary policy",
        "Tool validation contract"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Granting a broad token to a narrow task",
        "Treating retrieved text as instructions",
        "Equating a model error with an authorized security impact"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "mcp-progressive-scope-authority",
            "title": "MCP scope selection: progressive consent and accumulated authority",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/mcp-progressive-scope-authority/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-rag-retrieval-permission-boundaries",
            "title": "OWASP LLM08:2025: retrieval permissions and knowledge provenance",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-rag-retrieval-permission-boundaries/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-llm-output-consumer-trust",
            "title": "OWASP LLM05:2025: generated-output consumer trust",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-llm-output-consumer-trust/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "ai-content-authority-separation",
            "title": "Retrieved content is data, not authority",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/ai-content-authority-separation/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "google-gemini-enterprise-connected-content-memory-integrity-2026",
            "title": "Gemini Enterprise connected-content trust failure allowed persistent-memory modification",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-gemini-enterprise-connected-content-memory-integrity-2026/"
          },
          {
            "id": "google-gemini-colab-rendering-boundary-2025",
            "title": "Gemini-to-Colab rendering boundary exposed Workspace data",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-gemini-colab-rendering-boundary-2025/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/ai-agent/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/ai-agent/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "supply-chain",
      "name": "CI and dependency trust",
      "category": "Infrastructure",
      "summary": "Review build and dependency trust from source selection through a verifiable artifact and its deployment authority.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Workflow definitions",
        "Lockfiles and dependency policy",
        "Build identities and artifact attestations"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Map trusted inputs",
          "body": "Identify source revisions, external actions, package registries, caches, and contributors that influence a build."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review execution authority",
          "body": "Confirm untrusted changes cannot inherit secrets, deployment credentials, or mutable release authority."
        },
        {
          "title": "Verify provenance",
          "body": "Link the released artifact to its source, builder, dependency resolution, and approval evidence."
        },
        {
          "title": "Constrain dependencies",
          "body": "Use explicit registries, namespace ownership, immutable versions, and reviewable lockfile changes."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Build trust map",
        "Workflow permission review",
        "Dependency provenance record"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Assuming a repository event is trusted",
        "Using mutable build references",
        "Treating a package name as proof of ownership"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "slsa-v1-2-supply-chain-build-provenance",
            "title": "SLSA v1.2: supply-chain security and build provenance",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/slsa-v1-2-supply-chain-build-provenance/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-asvs-5-security-verification-standard",
            "title": "OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS)",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-asvs-5-security-verification-standard/"
          },
          {
            "id": "nist-sp-800-190-container-isolation-guide",
            "title": "NIST SP 800-190: Application Container Security Guide",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/nist-sp-800-190-container-isolation-guide/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "build-artifact-provenance-boundary",
            "title": "Build evidence must match the artifact and trusted builder",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/build-artifact-provenance-boundary/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "angular-ci-cache-trust-2026",
            "title": "Angular automation trust and cache isolation weakness",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/angular-ci-cache-trust-2026/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/supply-chain/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/supply-chain/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "mobile",
      "name": "Mobile links and API hosts",
      "category": "Application",
      "summary": "Review mobile link association, client configuration, and backend APIs as complementary controls with server-owned authorization.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "App link or universal-link association files",
        "Mobile client configuration",
        "API authorization design"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Inventory claimed destinations",
          "body": "Document verified domains, path rules, package identifiers, and the user-visible destination for each link class."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review handoff state",
          "body": "Ensure links do not carry authority that the backend cannot independently validate and expire."
        },
        {
          "title": "Trace backend ownership",
          "body": "For every mobile API object, verify the server authorizes the current user and tenant, independent of the app UI."
        },
        {
          "title": "Minimize local secrets",
          "body": "Review storage, logs, and diagnostics so tokens and account data are not exposed beyond the needed boundary."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Link association inventory",
        "Client-to-server authority map",
        "Local data handling notes"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Trusting a client-side route as authorization",
        "Leaving deep-link state reusable",
        "Treating a configured hostname as ownership proof"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "owasp-authorization-cheat-sheet",
            "title": "Authorization Cheat Sheet",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-authorization-cheat-sheet/"
          },
          {
            "id": "rfc-10017-browser-oauth-token-custody",
            "title": "RFC 10017: OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Applications",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/rfc-10017-browser-oauth-token-custody/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality",
            "title": "OWASP Logging: trustworthy and minimal application evidence",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "delegated-grant-authority-continuity",
            "title": "Delegated authority stays within the approved grant",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/delegated-grant-authority-continuity/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "google-device-authorization-client-scope-binding-2026",
            "title": "Google device grants lost client and permission binding",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-device-authorization-client-scope-binding-2026/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/mobile/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/mobile/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "parser",
      "name": "Parsers, archives, and fail-open",
      "category": "Application",
      "summary": "Review file and document processing as a chain of bounded parsing, typed validation, storage, and authorized action.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Parser and upload design",
        "Accepted file and archive policy",
        "Owned sample artifacts and unit tests"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Define accepted meaning",
          "body": "Specify supported formats, size and complexity budgets, encoding rules, and the safe typed result each parser may produce."
        },
        {
          "title": "Keep parsing contained",
          "body": "Run processing with minimal privileges and isolate it from sensitive filesystem, network, and interpreter authority."
        },
        {
          "title": "Validate after parsing",
          "body": "Treat parsed metadata and paths as untrusted until they satisfy an application-specific authorization and storage policy."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review failure behavior",
          "body": "Ensure malformed or unsupported input produces a bounded rejection without partial state or public diagnostics."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Format acceptance contract",
        "Processing isolation notes",
        "Failure-handling tests"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Trusting declared content type",
        "Letting parsed paths select storage targets",
        "Converting parser errors into permissive behavior"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "chromium-rule-of-two-input-isolation",
            "title": "Chromium Rule of Two: input trust, memory safety and privilege",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/chromium-rule-of-two-input-isolation/"
          },
          {
            "id": "pypdf-2026-attachment-processing-cost-boundary",
            "title": "pypdf: bound repeated work when reading embedded attachments",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/pypdf-2026-attachment-processing-cost-boundary/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-error-response-data-minimization",
            "title": "Error Handling Cheat Sheet",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-error-response-data-minimization/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "parsing-safety-action-authority",
            "title": "Parsing safety and action authority",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/parsing-safety-action-authority/"
          },
          {
            "id": "error-diagnostic-disclosure-boundary",
            "title": "Failures need separate public and diagnostic contracts",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/error-diagnostic-disclosure-boundary/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "google-chrome-v8-type-consistency-2025",
            "title": "V8 optimized object handling retained invalid type assumptions",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-chrome-v8-type-consistency-2025/"
          },
          {
            "id": "redis-lua-object-lifetime-isolation-2025",
            "title": "Redis Lua object lifetime failure crossed the scripting boundary",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/redis-lua-object-lifetime-isolation-2025/"
          },
          {
            "id": "facebook-error-response-data-isolation-2019",
            "title": "Facebook error responses exposed unintended application data",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/facebook-error-response-data-isolation-2019/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/parser/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/parser/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "report",
      "name": "Write the report",
      "category": "Research",
      "summary": "Produce a concise security record that separates observed evidence, bounded impact, uncertainty, and remediation.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Authorized observations",
        "Affected boundary and policy expectation",
        "Vendor or primary-source remediation context"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "State the boundary",
          "body": "Name the intended security property, who or what it protects, and the precise condition that did not hold."
        },
        {
          "title": "Separate evidence from inference",
          "body": "Mark direct observations, reproduced local results, modeled impact, and unanswered questions distinctly."
        },
        {
          "title": "Minimize sensitive material",
          "body": "Use owned, redacted evidence that lets maintainers understand the issue without exposing unnecessary data or instructions."
        },
        {
          "title": "Make the fix testable",
          "body": "Recommend a control and a regression assertion tied to the failed invariant."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Evidence-bounded finding",
        "Impact and uncertainty statement",
        "Testable remediation criteria"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Claiming impact beyond evidence",
        "Including secrets or third-party data",
        "Describing a fix without a security invariant"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "hackerone-quality-vulnerability-reports",
            "title": "Quality Reports",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/hackerone-quality-vulnerability-reports/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality",
            "title": "OWASP Logging: trustworthy and minimal application evidence",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-secure-code-review-methodology",
            "title": "OWASP Secure Code Review: baseline and change-focused review",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-secure-code-review-methodology/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "approval-version-integrity",
            "title": "Approval stays attached to the reviewed version",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/approval-version-integrity/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "google-cloud-build-approval-toctou-2025",
            "title": "Cloud Build approval was not bound to immutable code",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-cloud-build-approval-toctou-2025/"
          },
          {
            "id": "github-actions-reference-validation-2021",
            "title": "GitHub Actions trust depended on invalid repository references",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/github-actions-reference-validation-2021/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/report/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/report/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "cloud",
      "name": "Cloud object storage",
      "category": "Infrastructure",
      "summary": "Review cloud storage and service access through attributable ownership, least privilege, destination policy, and auditable configuration.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Cloud account and resource inventory",
        "IAM and storage policies",
        "Approved architecture and egress requirements"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Establish ownership",
          "body": "Tie each bucket, service identity, and integration to a documented account, environment, and responsible owner before drawing conclusions."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review effective policy",
          "body": "Evaluate identity, resource, network, and conditional policies together for the exact action and tenant context."
        },
        {
          "title": "Constrain service egress",
          "body": "Apply an explicit destination policy plus independent network controls for server-side requests."
        },
        {
          "title": "Audit change paths",
          "body": "Ensure configuration changes, public sharing, and credential rotation leave reviewable records and safe defaults."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Attributed asset inventory",
        "Effective-permission review",
        "Egress and audit controls"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Calling an internet-visible asset owned without attribution",
        "Reviewing IAM policies in isolation",
        "Using a network control as the only destination check"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "aws-iam-machine-identity-best-practices",
            "title": "AWS IAM security best practices for workload identities",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/aws-iam-machine-identity-best-practices/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-server-request-destination-boundaries",
            "title": "OWASP Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-server-request-destination-boundaries/"
          },
          {
            "id": "nist-sp-800-190-container-isolation-guide",
            "title": "NIST SP 800-190: Application Container Security Guide",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/nist-sp-800-190-container-isolation-guide/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "server-request-destination-policy",
            "title": "Layer server-request destination controls",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/server-request-destination-policy/"
          },
          {
            "id": "workload-identity-tenant-scope",
            "title": "Keep workload authority tenant-scoped",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/workload-identity-tenant-scope/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "shopify-exchange-request-isolation-2019",
            "title": "Shopify Exchange screenshot service crossed internal boundaries",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/shopify-exchange-request-isolation-2019/"
          },
          {
            "id": "meta-service-identity-secrets-trust-boundary-2026",
            "title": "Meta service-identity exposure amplified by excessive secret access",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/meta-service-identity-secrets-trust-boundary-2026/"
          },
          {
            "id": "google-actifio-driver-service-identity-isolation-2025",
            "title": "Actifio driver execution exposed excessive shared-service authority",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-actifio-driver-service-identity-isolation-2025/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/cloud/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/cloud/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "provision",
      "name": "Provisioning and invites",
      "category": "Identity",
      "summary": "Review invites, directory sync, and provisioning as high-authority lifecycle operations with tenant, role, and approval checks.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Provisioning protocol configuration",
        "Organization and role model",
        "Approved lifecycle events"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Map ownership",
          "body": "Bind each provider, invitation, group mapping, and lifecycle event to a specific organization owner and approved administrator."
        },
        {
          "title": "Constrain role changes",
          "body": "Require explicit policy for role assignment, deprovisioning, and cross-organization moves; do not infer authority from profile edits."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review durable links",
          "body": "Validate that directory attributes and external identities retain provenance and cannot silently rebind an account."
        },
        {
          "title": "Verify revocation",
          "body": "Confirm disabled users, removed memberships, and revoked providers lose access across all active interfaces."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Provisioning authority map",
        "Role-change policy",
        "Deprovisioning verification notes"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Treating an invite as blanket authority",
        "Allowing ownerless configuration",
        "Leaving stale group access after deprovisioning"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "better-auth-2026-scim-ownerless-provider-authority",
            "title": "Better Auth SCIM: absent ownership must not grant shared authority",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/better-auth-2026-scim-ownerless-provider-authority/"
          },
          {
            "id": "n8n-2026-ldap-account-linking-authority",
            "title": "n8n: directory-attribute authority in durable account linking",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/n8n-2026-ldap-account-linking-authority/"
          },
          {
            "id": "umbraco-2026-group-assignment-authority",
            "title": "Umbraco: editing an account does not authorize assigning every role",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/umbraco-2026-group-assignment-authority/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "identity-claim-binding",
            "title": "An identity claim must belong to the user",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/identity-claim-binding/"
          },
          {
            "id": "workload-identity-tenant-scope",
            "title": "Keep workload authority tenant-scoped",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/workload-identity-tenant-scope/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "apple-sign-in-identity-claim-binding-2020",
            "title": "Sign in with Apple failed to bind identity claims to the authenticated user",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/apple-sign-in-identity-claim-binding-2020/"
          },
          {
            "id": "github-oauth-method-semantics-2019",
            "title": "GitHub OAuth consent failed across request-method semantics",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/github-oauth-method-semantics-2019/"
          },
          {
            "id": "meta-service-identity-secrets-trust-boundary-2026",
            "title": "Meta service-identity exposure amplified by excessive secret access",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/meta-service-identity-secrets-trust-boundary-2026/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/provision/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/provision/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "billing",
      "name": "Billing and credits",
      "category": "Application",
      "summary": "Review prices, credits, refunds, and entitlements as server-owned state transitions that preserve an auditable ledger invariant.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Pricing and entitlement rules",
        "Payment and ledger state model",
        "Authorized test transactions"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Write the ledger invariant",
          "body": "Define the server-authoritative amount, currency, owner, entitlement, and allowed transition for each business event."
        },
        {
          "title": "Bind evidence to transition",
          "body": "Ensure payment confirmations, webhooks, and refunds are authenticated and tied to one intended state change."
        },
        {
          "title": "Protect concurrency",
          "body": "Use atomic checks and consumption rules so retries or parallel processing cannot duplicate an entitlement or reversal."
        },
        {
          "title": "Reconcile safely",
          "body": "Make correction and recovery flows preserve legitimate concurrent changes and create a complete audit record."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Ledger invariant",
        "State-transition map",
        "Reconciliation and audit criteria"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Trusting client totals",
        "Separating evidence from entitlement creation",
        "Using non-atomic balance updates"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [],
        "workbench": []
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "owasp-transaction-authorization-state-integrity",
            "title": "OWASP Transaction Authorization",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-transaction-authorization-state-integrity/"
          },
          {
            "id": "stripe-webhook-delivery-state-integrity",
            "title": "Stripe webhooks: authentic delivery and business-state integrity",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/stripe-webhook-delivery-state-integrity/"
          },
          {
            "id": "paymenter-2026-refund-transition-atomicity",
            "title": "Paymenter: refund entitlement and ledger changes need one atomic transition",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/paymenter-2026-refund-transition-atomicity/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "approval-version-integrity",
            "title": "Approval stays attached to the reviewed version",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/approval-version-integrity/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "google-cloud-build-approval-toctou-2025",
            "title": "Cloud Build approval was not bound to immutable code",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-cloud-build-approval-toctou-2025/"
          },
          {
            "id": "github-actions-reference-validation-2021",
            "title": "GitHub Actions trust depended on invalid repository references",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/github-actions-reference-validation-2021/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-11",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/billing/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/billing/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "hunt-intake",
      "name": "Hunt workspace intake",
      "category": "Research",
      "summary": "Start an authorized hunt as a portable, local project with scope, rules, and evidence boundaries recorded before work begins.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "User-supplied scope and rules references",
        "Local workspace location",
        "Approved accounts, environments, and evidence constraints"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Create the local boundary",
          "body": "When a local Hunt Workbench is available, call init_hunt_workspace with the user-supplied scope and rules references. Keep its data and credentials in the selected local workspace."
        },
        {
          "title": "Separate discovery from authorization",
          "body": "Record known assets as inventory. A hostname, URL, or technology fingerprint found during recon does not add permission to test it."
        },
        {
          "title": "Set evidence rules",
          "body": "Decide which owned accounts and redacted artifacts can support a check. Use hosted get_research_context, search_research, or get_research_record only for public citations."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Local workspace with scope references",
        "Authorization and evidence boundary",
        "Initial inventory marked separately from scope"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Treating discovery as authorization",
        "Sending private scope or evidence to the hosted MCP",
        "Starting checks before rules are recorded"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [
          "get_research_context",
          "search_research",
          "get_research_record"
        ],
        "workbench": [
          "init_hunt_workspace",
          "search_hunt_records"
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "owasp-threat-modeling-assumptions-and-validation",
            "title": "OWASP Threat Modeling: system assumptions and mitigation validation",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-threat-modeling-assumptions-and-validation/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-secure-code-review-methodology",
            "title": "OWASP Secure Code Review: baseline and change-focused review",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-secure-code-review-methodology/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "workload-identity-tenant-scope",
            "title": "Keep workload authority tenant-scoped",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/workload-identity-tenant-scope/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "meta-service-identity-secrets-trust-boundary-2026",
            "title": "Meta service-identity exposure amplified by excessive secret access",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/meta-service-identity-secrets-trust-boundary-2026/"
          },
          {
            "id": "google-actifio-driver-service-identity-isolation-2025",
            "title": "Actifio driver execution exposed excessive shared-service authority",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-actifio-driver-service-identity-isolation-2025/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-12",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/hunt-intake/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/hunt-intake/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "recon-review",
      "name": "Recon review and normalization",
      "category": "Research",
      "summary": "Normalize saved recon into a provenance-preserving local inventory, then use it to expose coverage gaps without expanding authorization.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Saved URL lists, JSONL, CSV, or HAR files",
        "Tool and collection timestamps",
        "Recorded scope and rules"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Import rather than paste",
          "body": "When a local Hunt Workbench is available, call import_recon for each saved artifact. Preserve its source, timestamp, and observed technology fingerprints; repeated imports should remain idempotent."
        },
        {
          "title": "Review normalized inventory",
          "body": "Use search_hunt_records to find assets, routes, technologies, and prior activity. Keep observed hosts distinct from authorized targets."
        },
        {
          "title": "Record coverage honestly",
          "body": "Use record_check for what was reviewed and its state. Keep not_tested, partial, blocked, failed, deferred, and out_of_scope distinct so gaps remain visible."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Deduplicated asset inventory with provenance",
        "Technology and route observations",
        "Coverage record with explicit gaps"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Discarding source or timestamp during normalization",
        "Treating a discovered asset as in scope",
        "Calling a partial crawl complete coverage"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [
          "get_research_context",
          "search_research",
          "get_research_record"
        ],
        "workbench": [
          "import_recon",
          "search_hunt_records",
          "record_check"
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "owasp-secure-code-review-methodology",
            "title": "OWASP Secure Code Review: baseline and change-focused review",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-secure-code-review-methodology/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality",
            "title": "OWASP Logging: trustworthy and minimal application evidence",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "server-request-destination-policy",
            "title": "Layer server-request destination controls",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/server-request-destination-policy/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "shopify-exchange-request-isolation-2019",
            "title": "Shopify Exchange screenshot service crossed internal boundaries",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/shopify-exchange-request-isolation-2019/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-12",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/recon-review/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/recon-review/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "lead-triage",
      "name": "Lead triage",
      "category": "Research",
      "summary": "Turn an observation into a ranked, evidence-aware hypothesis with one clear test that could prove or reject it.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Observed behavior and stable record references",
        "Applicable scope and safety limits",
        "A candidate decisive test"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Name the observation",
          "body": "Record what was directly seen without assigning impact. Link existing assets, checks, timestamps, and evidence references with search_hunt_records."
        },
        {
          "title": "State the hypothesis",
          "body": "When a local Hunt Workbench is available, call upsert_lead with supporting observations, possible impact, missing proof, rank, and the next decisive test. A lead is not a validated finding."
        },
        {
          "title": "Plan one discriminator",
          "body": "Use record_check to preserve the planned test and its limits. Use next_actions when several gaps compete; it should rank work, not convert a hypothesis into fact."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Ranked lead with stable ID",
        "Observation and hypothesis kept separate",
        "One authorized decisive test"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Writing impact as observed fact",
        "Treating a technology fingerprint as proof",
        "Planning broad retesting instead of a discriminator"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [
          "get_research_context",
          "search_research",
          "get_research_record"
        ],
        "workbench": [
          "upsert_lead",
          "record_check",
          "next_actions",
          "search_hunt_records"
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "owasp-threat-modeling-assumptions-and-validation",
            "title": "OWASP Threat Modeling: system assumptions and mitigation validation",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-threat-modeling-assumptions-and-validation/"
          },
          {
            "id": "hackerone-quality-vulnerability-reports",
            "title": "Quality Reports",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/hackerone-quality-vulnerability-reports/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "approval-version-integrity",
            "title": "Approval stays attached to the reviewed version",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/approval-version-integrity/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "google-cloud-build-approval-toctou-2025",
            "title": "Cloud Build approval was not bound to immutable code",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-cloud-build-approval-toctou-2025/"
          },
          {
            "id": "github-actions-reference-validation-2021",
            "title": "GitHub Actions trust depended on invalid repository references",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/github-actions-reference-validation-2021/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-12",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/lead-triage/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/lead-triage/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "validation",
      "name": "Evidence-led validation",
      "category": "Research",
      "summary": "Run the smallest authorized check that resolves a claim, then retain an evidence-linked outcome even when the result is incomplete.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "A bounded hypothesis or security invariant",
        "Approved account and test conditions",
        "Evidence location and command or tool version"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Define a decision",
          "body": "Write the expected allowed and denied outcome before testing. Favor owned objects and a minimal action that can decide the claim."
        },
        {
          "title": "Record the actual result",
          "body": "When a local Hunt Workbench is available, call record_check with status, command or tool version, limits, outcome, evidence links, and next action. Do not flatten partial, blocked, failed, or not_tested into one result."
        },
        {
          "title": "Update the claim",
          "body": "Use upsert_lead only to update the hypothesis and its missing proof. A validated finding requires direct evidence for the stated boundary; unresolved evidence remains a lead."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Evidence-linked check record",
        "Accurate outcome state",
        "Updated proof gap or validated boundary"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Calling a blocked check a negative result",
        "Overwriting earlier evidence",
        "Escalating beyond the approved test condition"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [
          "get_research_context",
          "search_research",
          "get_research_record"
        ],
        "workbench": [
          "record_check",
          "search_hunt_records",
          "upsert_lead"
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality",
            "title": "OWASP Logging: trustworthy and minimal application evidence",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-secure-code-review-methodology",
            "title": "OWASP Secure Code Review: baseline and change-focused review",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-secure-code-review-methodology/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "approval-version-integrity",
            "title": "Approval stays attached to the reviewed version",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/approval-version-integrity/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "google-cloud-build-approval-toctou-2025",
            "title": "Cloud Build approval was not bound to immutable code",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-cloud-build-approval-toctou-2025/"
          },
          {
            "id": "github-actions-reference-validation-2021",
            "title": "GitHub Actions trust depended on invalid repository references",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/github-actions-reference-validation-2021/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-12",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/validation/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/validation/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "skeptical-review",
      "name": "Skeptical review",
      "category": "Research",
      "summary": "Stress-test a lead against benign explanations and missing proof before time or impact claims grow around it.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Lead and linked observations",
        "Recorded checks and their outcome states",
        "Scope limits for any follow-up"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Retrieve the evidence trail",
          "body": "Use search_hunt_records to collect the lead, linked checks, asset provenance, and evidence references before interpreting the result."
        },
        {
          "title": "Test the inference",
          "body": "List the strongest alternative explanation and the specific evidence it would predict. Use upsert_lead to preserve missing proof and uncertainty without rewriting observations."
        },
        {
          "title": "Choose the smallest next test",
          "body": "Record an authorized discriminator with record_check, or use next_actions to compare it with other evidence gaps. Hosted research may supply public context only; private artifacts stay local."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Evidence trail and alternative explanation",
        "Preserved uncertainty",
        "Minimal discriminating next action"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Confusing correlation with a boundary failure",
        "Discarding failed or blocked checks",
        "Sending private artifacts to the hosted MCP"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [
          "get_research_context",
          "search_research",
          "get_research_record"
        ],
        "workbench": [
          "search_hunt_records",
          "upsert_lead",
          "record_check",
          "next_actions"
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "owasp-threat-modeling-assumptions-and-validation",
            "title": "OWASP Threat Modeling: system assumptions and mitigation validation",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-threat-modeling-assumptions-and-validation/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality",
            "title": "OWASP Logging: trustworthy and minimal application evidence",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "combined-view-source-authorization",
            "title": "Combined views preserve every source's access boundary",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/combined-view-source-authorization/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "github-cross-repository-comparison-authorization-2025",
            "title": "GitHub comparison output lacked source-repository authorization",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/github-cross-repository-comparison-authorization-2025/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-12",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/skeptical-review/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/skeptical-review/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "reporting",
      "name": "Finding reporting",
      "category": "Research",
      "summary": "Build a concise finding from durable evidence while separating validated behavior, modeled impact, and unresolved uncertainty.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Validated check records and evidence references",
        "Relevant lead history",
        "Affected security boundary and remediation expectation"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Assemble only supporting records",
          "body": "Use search_hunt_records to retrieve the exact assets, checks, leads, and evidence that support the report. Keep observations and validated findings in separate sentences."
        },
        {
          "title": "State impact at its evidence level",
          "body": "Describe direct impact as observed, plausible impact as modeled, and remaining gaps as uncertainty. A lead does not become a vulnerability merely because it is ranked highly."
        },
        {
          "title": "Export a reviewable brief",
          "body": "When a local Hunt Workbench is available, use export_handoff to generate a concise Markdown brief with scope, coverage, blockers, and evidence-linked next steps. Add public citations from hosted research only when they add context."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Evidence-bounded finding draft",
        "Explicit impact and uncertainty statement",
        "Portable Markdown brief with record references"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Claiming impact beyond the records",
        "Embedding secrets or unneeded third-party data",
        "Presenting a lead as validated"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [
          "get_research_context",
          "search_research",
          "get_research_record"
        ],
        "workbench": [
          "search_hunt_records",
          "record_check",
          "upsert_lead",
          "export_handoff"
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "hackerone-quality-vulnerability-reports",
            "title": "Quality Reports",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/hackerone-quality-vulnerability-reports/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality",
            "title": "OWASP Logging: trustworthy and minimal application evidence",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "approval-version-integrity",
            "title": "Approval stays attached to the reviewed version",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/approval-version-integrity/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "google-cloud-build-approval-toctou-2025",
            "title": "Cloud Build approval was not bound to immutable code",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-cloud-build-approval-toctou-2025/"
          },
          {
            "id": "github-actions-reference-validation-2021",
            "title": "GitHub Actions trust depended on invalid repository references",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/github-actions-reference-validation-2021/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-12",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/reporting/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/reporting/SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "slug": "handoff",
      "name": "Research handoff",
      "category": "Research",
      "summary": "Package local hunt state so another researcher or client can resume from evidence, gaps, and ranked actions without repeating work.",
      "scope": "Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question.",
      "inputs": [
        "Local workspace with stable records",
        "Current scope and rules references",
        "Recent checks, leads, and evidence locations"
      ],
      "review": [
        {
          "title": "Review the state",
          "body": "Use search_hunt_records to confirm scope references, assets, check states, leads, activity, and evidence links. Preserve partial, blocked, failed, and not_tested work as useful history."
        },
        {
          "title": "Rank continuation work",
          "body": "When a local Hunt Workbench is available, call next_actions for a short ranked set of gaps and leads. Its rationale may reference public vulns.co research, while workspace evidence remains local."
        },
        {
          "title": "Export without overstating",
          "body": "Call export_handoff for a concise Markdown brief. It must cite underlying records and label leads as hypotheses until validated evidence supports a finding."
        }
      ],
      "outputs": [
        "Evidence-linked Markdown handoff",
        "Coverage and blocker summary",
        "Ranked next actions with rationale"
      ],
      "pitfalls": [
        "Hiding incomplete or failed work",
        "Leaving scope references out of the handoff",
        "Describing a hypothesis as a confirmed vulnerability"
      ],
      "mcp": {
        "hosted": [
          "get_research_context",
          "search_research",
          "get_research_record"
        ],
        "workbench": [
          "next_actions",
          "export_handoff",
          "search_hunt_records"
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "resources": [
          {
            "id": "hackerone-quality-vulnerability-reports",
            "title": "Quality Reports",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/hackerone-quality-vulnerability-reports/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality",
            "title": "OWASP Logging: trustworthy and minimal application evidence",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-security-logging-evidence-quality/"
          },
          {
            "id": "owasp-secure-code-review-methodology",
            "title": "OWASP Secure Code Review: baseline and change-focused review",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-secure-code-review-methodology/"
          }
        ],
        "diagrams": [
          {
            "id": "approval-version-integrity",
            "title": "Approval stays attached to the reviewed version",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/approval-version-integrity/"
          }
        ],
        "reports": [
          {
            "id": "google-cloud-build-approval-toctou-2025",
            "title": "Cloud Build approval was not bound to immutable code",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/google-cloud-build-approval-toctou-2025/"
          },
          {
            "id": "github-actions-reference-validation-2021",
            "title": "GitHub Actions trust depended on invalid repository references",
            "url": "https://vulns.co/research/reports/github-actions-reference-validation-2021/"
          }
        ]
      },
      "provenance": {
        "publisher": "vulns.co / GK Data",
        "guide_updated": "2026-10-12",
        "library_as_of": "2026-10-12",
        "library_commit": "3456502bc71da956ad118200675adb1f1faa4e28"
      },
      "url": "https://vulns.co/skills/handoff/",
      "markdown_url": "https://vulns.co/skills/handoff/SKILL.md"
    }
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}
