--- name: session description: "Assess session issuance, recovery, revocation, and privilege changes as one continuous account-authority lifecycle." --- # Session, cookies, and passkeys Assess session issuance, recovery, revocation, and privilege changes as one continuous account-authority lifecycle. Defensive study and review of artifacts supplied by their owner. Record missing evidence as an open question. ## Bring to the review - Session and cookie configuration - Recovery and logout flows - Approved browser sessions ## Review guide ### 1. Inventory authority Identify the server-recognized session, its binding attributes, expiry, rotation, and the events that should revoke it. ### 2. Map transitions Review login, recovery, credential change, role change, and logout for consistent reauthentication and invalidation rules. ### 3. Check parallel state Confirm the same revocation rules reach browser sessions, APIs, and persistent connections. ### 4. Review recovery proof Ensure account recovery establishes ownership without leaving older authority usable. ## What to produce - Session lifecycle map - Revocation expectations - Recovery control notes ## Common mistakes - Treating logout as a client-only event - Ignoring active sessions after recovery - Confusing encryption with token authenticity ## Reading and source context ### Resources - [OWASP Session Management: privilege-transition integrity](https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-session-privilege-transition-integrity/) - [OWASP Forgot Password](https://vulns.co/research/resources/owasp-account-recovery-state-integrity/) - [Adversarial passkeys: account recovery must close every continuing source of authority](https://vulns.co/research/resources/usenix-2026-passkey-remediation-authority-lifecycle/) ### Diagrams - [Recovery must preserve account ownership](https://vulns.co/research/diagrams/account-recovery-challenge-lifecycle/) ### Reports - [GitLab recovery delivery lacked verified-address binding](https://vulns.co/research/reports/gitlab-recovery-address-binding-cve-2023-7028/) - [Microsoft account recovery lacked consistent attempt-limit enforcement](https://vulns.co/research/reports/microsoft-account-recovery-rate-limit-consistency-2021/) - [Instagram recovery challenges were insufficiently bound to accounts](https://vulns.co/research/reports/instagram-recovery-challenge-account-binding-2019/) ## Provenance Editorial guide by vulns.co / GK Data. Updated 2026-10-11. Library snapshot: 2026-10-04; commit d5550c7891119cf1379e235721541c947850a3b3. The guide is an editorial synthesis. Linked records preserve their own sources and review dates. Reader: https://vulns.co/skills/session/