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GitLab · Authentication and identity

GitLab recovery delivery lacked verified-address binding

GitLab's recovery feature could send password-reset messages without consistently checking that the recipient address belonged to the account. Enforced two-factor authentication still prevented login, but did not prevent a password reset; offering SSO alone was insufficient if password login remained available. GitLab awarded USD 35,000 across two decisions for this one report.

Read the original writeupUSD 35,000 reported award · Reviewed 2026-10-02

Root cause

A secondary-address recovery feature expanded delivery choices without consistently preserving verified-address ownership. The vendor attributes the regression to email verification; recovery authorization must remain bound to trusted account state as features change.

Demonstrated impact

Unauthorized password changes could lead to account takeover. Enforced second-factor authentication still prevented login, but did not prevent password reset. Offering SSO alone did not eliminate exposure when password authentication remained available.

What to check for

  • Bind recovery delivery to verified account state and validate security-sensitive input contracts.
  • Review recovery paths independently of primary authentication and optional SSO.
  • Vendor remediation added end-to-end reset tests covering address handling, email generation and content; review the whole recovery contract rather than one validation function.
  • Separate patch deployment from compromise assessment; apply the vendor’s incident-response guidance where compromise is suspected.

Award and evidence

USD 35,000Bug Bounty · Vendor Confirmed
How the award was verified, and what the record does not establish

USD 1,000 initial plus USD 34,000 additional award for one report. Dollar notation uses HackerOne policy currency context; cash receipt unverified.

  • Award events do not establish cash settlement.
  • The report UI has no CVE field value; CVE association comes from the matching vendor advisory.
  • Detailed report publication is not the first public advisory date.
  • The advisory’s historical observation of no detected abuse on vendor-managed platforms does not establish present-day absence of compromise or the state of self-managed deployments.

Timeline

Published
2025-02-26explicit · Detailed report publication, later than the vendor advisory.
Public Disclosure
2024-01-11explicit · Public vendor advisory; detailed report followed February 26, 2025.
Reported
2023-12-20explicit
Awarded
2024-01-12explicit · Final award event; initial award December 22, 2023.
Fixed
2024-01-11explicit · Public patched release. GitLab.com was patched earlier; its exact deployment date is not supplied.

Related visual models

Related cases

All 11 cases in Authentication and identity

Sources

  1. Account Takeover via Password Reset without user interactionsGitLab and asterion04 · reviewed 2026-10-02
  2. GitLab Critical Security Release: 16.7.2, 16.6.4, 16.5.6GitLab · reviewed 2026-10-02
  3. Vulnerability Disclosure Standards: Bug Bounty payment denominationHackerOne · reviewed 2026-10-02

Record reviewed 2026-10-02. Snapshot af2809c308fc. Open the complete JSON contract.

Library synced 2026-11-18 · cases last reviewed 2026-10-05

af2809c308fc · JSON exports & schemas · CC BY 4.0 content / MIT software