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Google · Authentication and identity

Google device grants lost client and permission binding

Google's device authorization flow did not consistently preserve the intended device, application and permissions through sign-in. The researcher reports account and mailbox access; the reduced-interaction case required a signed-in user to open a link and have relevant prior consent. The researcher reports a USD 13,337 award, but the evidence does not establish that every integration was affected.

Read the original writeupUSD 13,337 reported award · Reviewed 2026-10-03

Root cause

The account completing sign-in could authorize a different requesting device, and the grant did not preserve the intended client and permissions. The researcher compared the initial approval with the authority of the final token. Cross-device sign-in is expected behavior; the flaw was losing the link to the intended recipient and permissions.

Demonstrated impact

The author reports third-party account access, elevated permissions and mailbox access. Reduced-interaction behavior required a signed-in user opening a link and relevant prior consent. Universal reach, unrestricted persistence and uniform absence of alerts are not independently established.

What to check for

  • Preserve one server-side authorization decision across device identity, client identity, subject and permitted actions; every completion path must respect it.
  • The researcher recommends server-side grant binding and explicit device confirmation. These are proposed controls, not verified descriptions of the deployed fix.

Award and evidence

USD 13,337Bug Bounty · Researcher Reported
How the award was verified, and what the record does not establish

One chain award, counted once. The researcher uses $. USD is inferred from Google’s March 2017 program-wide denomination statement, about nine years before the April 2026 award. That context does not independently establish this individual award’s currency or settlement; cash receipt is unverified.

  • No independently reviewed vendor evidence establishes technical reach, award or settlement.
  • The March 28, 2026 marked-fixed status does not establish deployment timing or patch contents.
  • Specific client permissions, existing consent and downstream token acceptance constrain the reported impact; one broad title does not prove every integration was affected.

Timeline

Published
2026-07-15explicit
Reported
2026-02-25explicit
Awarded
2026-04-02explicit

Related visual models

Related cases

All 11 cases in Authentication and identity

Sources

  1. Confused Deputy: Google IdP Universal Account Takeover via Device Code Flow Hijackingweirdmachine64 · reviewed 2026-10-03
  2. VRP news from NullconGoogle Security Blog · reviewed 2026-10-03

Record reviewed 2026-10-03. Snapshot af2809c308fc. Open the complete JSON contract.

Library synced 2026-11-18 · cases last reviewed 2026-10-05

af2809c308fc · JSON exports & schemas · CC BY 4.0 content / MIT software