Root cause
A browser message origin became trusted script-host configuration without origin authorization.
Demonstrated impact
The researcher reports script execution and describes possible account takeover. The scenario depends on specific embedded-browser, initialization and content-policy conditions plus influence over permitted third-party content. Account impact additionally assumes user interaction and an authenticated session; universal or interaction-free exploitation is not established.
What to check for
- Authorize message origins and senders independently of message content; treat an integration identifier as data rather than proof of authority.
- Keep script-source authority separate from mutable messaging configuration, and review it together with browser isolation and content policy.
- Define regression coverage for initialization state, embedded-browser behavior and third-party trust; distinguish observed execution from modeled account impact.
Award and evidence
How the award was verified, and what the record does not establish
Separate from Bug #2; no aggregation. The dollar sign is interpreted as USD using official 2020 program context, nearly five years earlier. This does not establish individual settlement currency or payment.
- Researcher-reported award, not vendor-confirmed payment; settlement date remains unknown.
- USD is contextual inference with an almost five-year gap, not an individual receipt.
- Original publication and earliest disclosure remain unknown.
- The narrative puts Bug #2 after reporting Bug #1; the labeled timeline orders reports oppositely. Dates follow labels without reconciling the conflict.
- Execution is researcher-reported; completed account takeover, population-wide exposure and exact patch coverage are not independently established.
- The article-wide zero-click framing should not be generalized to this interaction-dependent finding.
Timeline
- Reported
- 2024-11-24explicit · Explicit Timeline entry labeled Bug #1.
- Awarded
- 2024-12-24explicit · Explicit Timeline entry labeled Bug #1.
- Fixed
- 2024-12-11explicit · Explicit Timeline entry labeled Bug #1.
Related cases
- Chrome graphics input validation weakened an isolation boundary
Google · Client and browser security · USD 250,000
- Google IDX worker messaging crossed browser trust boundaries
Google · Client and browser security · USD 22,500
- Safari origin confusion undermined stored media permissions
Apple · Client and browser security · USD 75,000
- iCloud sharing consent and Safari trust boundaries failed together
Apple · Client and browser security · USD 100,500
- Meta service-identity exposure amplified by excessive secret access
Meta · Cloud permissions and isolation · USD 150,000
- Instagram embedding fallback changed the authorization context
Meta · Authorization and tenant boundaries · USD 14,500
Sources
- Multiple XSS in Meta Conversion API Gateway Leading to Zero-Click Account TakeoverYoussef Sammouda · reviewed 2026-10-03
- Facebook Bug Bounty and BountyCon US-dollar reportingDan Gurfinkel / Facebook · reviewed 2026-10-03
Record reviewed 2026-10-03. Snapshot af2809c308fc. Open the complete JSON contract.