vulns.co
/
GKData.io MCP and API Buy me a coffee

Meta · Client and browser security

Meta Conversions API Gateway trusted message origins as script authority

Meta's Conversions API Gateway treated a browser message's origin as authority to choose a script source without verifying that authority. The researcher reports script execution under specific embedded-browser, initialization and content-policy conditions; the proposed account impact also required user interaction and a signed-in session. The researcher assigns a separate $62,500 award to this client-side finding, labeled Bug #1.

Read the original writeupUSD 62,500 reported award · Reviewed 2026-10-03

Root cause

A browser message origin became trusted script-host configuration without origin authorization.

Demonstrated impact

The researcher reports script execution and describes possible account takeover. The scenario depends on specific embedded-browser, initialization and content-policy conditions plus influence over permitted third-party content. Account impact additionally assumes user interaction and an authenticated session; universal or interaction-free exploitation is not established.

What to check for

  • Authorize message origins and senders independently of message content; treat an integration identifier as data rather than proof of authority.
  • Keep script-source authority separate from mutable messaging configuration, and review it together with browser isolation and content policy.
  • Define regression coverage for initialization state, embedded-browser behavior and third-party trust; distinguish observed execution from modeled account impact.

Award and evidence

USD 62,500Bug Bounty · Researcher Reported
How the award was verified, and what the record does not establish

Separate from Bug #2; no aggregation. The dollar sign is interpreted as USD using official 2020 program context, nearly five years earlier. This does not establish individual settlement currency or payment.

  • Researcher-reported award, not vendor-confirmed payment; settlement date remains unknown.
  • USD is contextual inference with an almost five-year gap, not an individual receipt.
  • Original publication and earliest disclosure remain unknown.
  • The narrative puts Bug #2 after reporting Bug #1; the labeled timeline orders reports oppositely. Dates follow labels without reconciling the conflict.
  • Execution is researcher-reported; completed account takeover, population-wide exposure and exact patch coverage are not independently established.
  • The article-wide zero-click framing should not be generalized to this interaction-dependent finding.

Timeline

Reported
2024-11-24explicit · Explicit Timeline entry labeled Bug #1.
Awarded
2024-12-24explicit · Explicit Timeline entry labeled Bug #1.
Fixed
2024-12-11explicit · Explicit Timeline entry labeled Bug #1.

Related cases

All 5 cases in Client and browser security

Sources

  1. Multiple XSS in Meta Conversion API Gateway Leading to Zero-Click Account TakeoverYoussef Sammouda · reviewed 2026-10-03
  2. Facebook Bug Bounty and BountyCon US-dollar reportingDan Gurfinkel / Facebook · reviewed 2026-10-03

Record reviewed 2026-10-03. Snapshot af2809c308fc. Open the complete JSON contract.

Library synced 2026-11-18 · cases last reviewed 2026-10-05

af2809c308fc · JSON exports & schemas · CC BY 4.0 content / MIT software