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Apollo GraphQL

Apollo Federation: preserving the router-to-subgraph boundary

Apollo's guidance says internal GraphQL subgraphs must accept traffic only through the router for centralized security controls to hold. Disabling ordinary client introspection does not remove the coordination features used by federation. Hiding schema discovery therefore cannot replace the isolation needed for router-enforced authorization, resource limits and operation restrictions.

Open the referenceArchitecture GuideReviewed 2026-10-03

How to use this reference

For an owned federated design, document router and subgraph responsibilities. Require network isolation and authenticated router-to-subgraph communication, retain entry-point authorization, and review resource limits and schema-change permissions as separate controls.

Before reading

  • GraphQL federation architecture
  • Service authentication and network isolation concepts

Context and limits

  • Vendor architecture guidance, not a disclosed product vulnerability or evidence about a particular deployment.
  • Disabling ordinary introspection does not replace subgraph isolation.
  • Prerequisites and the review exercise are editorial guidance.

Sources

  1. Securing Apollo Federation Subgraphs: Context and Best PracticesApollo GraphQL · reviewed 2026-10-03

Record reviewed 2026-10-03. Snapshot af2809c308fc. Open the complete JSON contract.

Library synced 2026-11-18 · cases last reviewed 2026-10-05

af2809c308fc · JSON exports & schemas · CC BY 4.0 content / MIT software