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Model Context Protocol

MCP elicitation: consent, credential custody and completion

The MCP specification keeps secrets out of form elicitation and places sensitive URL interactions outside the client and model context, with the requesting server and destination visible to the user. Agreeing to open an interaction does not prove it finished; the server checks completion separately. For third-party OAuth, the MCP server holds the resulting credentials, and that grant is separate from the client's permission to access the server.

Open the referenceTechnical StandardReviewed 2026-10-04

How to use this reference

Editorial guidance: map the data recipient, credential holder and authoritative completion evidence for each interaction. Preserve decline and cancellation, bind completion to the initiating identity, and review navigation consent and automatic URL handling independently.

Before reading

  • MCP client/server roles, OAuth delegation and credential storage

Context and limits

  • The form prohibition concerns access or transaction secrets; ordinary contact data is not categorically excluded.
  • Elicitation prohibits automatic URL or metadata prefetching and navigation without explicit consent. It requires the full URL to be shown and credentials to stay out of URLs.
  • The overview states that protocol rules alone cannot enforce its security principles; implementation controls remain necessary.
  • No deployed vulnerability, remediation or award is established. The URL version is preserved separately from unknown publication and release dates.

Sources

  1. ElicitationModel Context Protocol · reviewed 2026-10-04
  2. Specification: Security and Trust & SafetyModel Context Protocol · reviewed 2026-10-04

Record reviewed 2026-10-04. Snapshot af2809c308fc. Open the complete JSON contract.

Library synced 2026-11-18 · cases last reviewed 2026-10-05

af2809c308fc · JSON exports & schemas · CC BY 4.0 content / MIT software