Parser and control bypass reference
CORS misconfiguration
Find an origin the server will trust with credentials. Confirm with the CSP/CORS checks on /utils/.
Compare behaviorA bypass claim needs a control request and a clear boundary that changed.
Stop after confirmation. Do not escalate impact without separate authorization.
Reflected origin + credentials
Full account-data theft when credentials are allowed and any origin is echoed.
Origin: https://evil.com → ACAO: https://evil.com + ACAC: true
Null origin
Reachable from an attacker-controlled sandboxed iframe or data: document.
Origin: null
Weak origin match
Sloppy startsWith / endsWith / regex origin checks accept lookalike domains.
Origin: https://target.com.evil.comOrigin: https://evil-target.comOrigin: https://targetXcom
Trusted-subdomain XSS chain
Turns a low-value subdomain XSS into reading the main app's data.
XSS on any *.target.com → credentialed fetch to the main app
Non-HTTPS trust
Allows a MITM on plaintext to read cross-origin responses.
Origin: http://target.com
Version history: normalized permanent page created 2026-08-20.