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Meta · Authentication and identity

Meta Accounts Center linking lost credential and identity confinement

Meta's Facebook–Instagram linking flow did not consistently keep credentials and approval tied to the intended accounts. The researcher reports unauthorized linking and persistent control, but the scenario required an attacker-controlled Instagram account, account-specific authorization material, and a signed-in Facebook user's visit and confirmation. The researcher reports a USD 30,000 award; mobile sign-in impact was described as potential.

Read the original writeupUSD 30,000 reported award · Reviewed 2026-10-03

Root cause

SSO destination checks and browser-message handling did not keep account-linking credentials within their intended recipients. The session identity could also differ from the person approving the connection, allowing one account’s linking authority to be used across account boundaries.

Demonstrated impact

The researcher reports unauthorized Facebook linking and persistent account control. Prerequisites included an attacker-controlled Instagram account, account-specific authorization material, an authenticated Facebook user visiting attacker-controlled content, and user confirmation. Mobile sign-in is described as potential; no widespread exploitation is established.

What to check for

  • Bind linking approval to both intended account identities, the initiating session, and the exact operation.
  • Constrain credential delivery end to end, including browser-message recipients and final redirect destinations.
  • Make identity changes visible and require fresh authorization when a sensitive linking flow changes account context.
  • Treat these as defensive design recommendations rather than a reconstruction of the undisclosed vendor patch.

Award and evidence

USD 30,000Bug Bounty · Researcher Reported
How the award was verified, and what the record does not establish

The article assigns one award to the reported finding. It uses $; USD is inferred from official February 2020 program-wide reporting, roughly five years before this award. That contextual source does not verify the individual denomination or settlement. No conflicting currency was identified.

  • The award and overall fix are researcher-reported; vendor confirmation and cash settlement are unverified.
  • Original publication is unknown, so no preferred-window inclusion is claimed.
  • USD relies on earlier program-wide context rather than report-specific currency evidence.
  • The source inconsistently names the final return host; no exact route or operational sequence is inferred.
  • This account-linking report is counted once, not as separate records for its constituent weaknesses.

Timeline

Reported
2024-10-16explicit
Awarded
2024-11-27explicit
Fixed
2024-11-05explicit · Overall researcher timeline label; component-level remediation and patch details are not independently verified.

Related cases

All 11 cases in Authentication and identity

Sources

  1. Two-click Facebook account takeover via FXAuth token and blob theftYoussef Sammouda · reviewed 2026-10-03
  2. Una mirada retrospectiva a los aspectos más destacados de Bug Bounty 2019Dan Gurfinkel / Facebook · reviewed 2026-10-03

Record reviewed 2026-10-03. Snapshot af2809c308fc. Open the complete JSON contract.

Library synced 2026-11-18 · cases last reviewed 2026-10-05

af2809c308fc · JSON exports & schemas · CC BY 4.0 content / MIT software