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GKData.io MCP

Sigstore · 1 min read

Sigstore Security Model

Sigstore's security guide explains how software signatures link an artifact to a signing identity and an auditable history. It describes identity issuers, Fulcio's short-lived certificates, trusted roots and Rekor's logs as separate parts of that assurance. Signatures do not assess code quality, and detecting misuse through transparency still requires someone to monitor the logs.

Open the reference Architecture GuideReviewed 2026-10-12

How to use this reference

Identify the expected publisher or workload and its issuer, document which certificate authority and log are trusted, and assign responsibility for detecting unexpected signing events. Trace the trust boundary from identity issuer through certificate and artifact to the consumer’s acceptance policy.

Before reading

  • Basic hashes and digital signatures
  • Familiarity with CI and workload identity

Context and limits

  • A compromised identity issuer or certificate authority can issue unauthorized certificates. Transparency makes misuse detectable only when someone monitors the logs.
  • Signing is not a code-quality assessment; consumers still need an acceptance policy.

Sources and provenance

  1. Security Model Sigstore · reviewed 2026-10-12

Record reviewed 2026-10-12. Snapshot cb017eaea66e. Open the complete JSON contract.

GitHub snapshot 2026-10-12

cb017eaea66e · JSON exports & schemas · CC BY 4.0 content / MIT software