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Meta · Authentication and identity

Facebook SDK message authentication relied on insecure randomness

Facebook's SDK used weak message authentication and could render supplied content as active HTML. The researcher reports account takeover under mobile in-app browser conditions and a USD 66,000 award. The effect on other websites depended on their framing controls, so the report does not show that every SDK integration was equally affected.

Read the original writeupUSD 66,000 reported award · Reviewed 2026-10-02

Root cause

The SDK treated a callback identifier as an authentication secret even though it came from non-cryptographic randomness. The researcher traced messages from an embedded plugin into the SDK’s handlers and checked how they were authorized. A separate handler rendered supplied content as active HTML. Checking the message’s origin alone did not prove that its content was authorized or safe to render.

Demonstrated impact

The researcher reports script execution and Facebook account takeover under mobile in-app browser conditions. Impact on an arbitrary embedding site depended on its framing controls. The article does not establish that every website using the SDK was affected equally.

What to check for

  • Use cryptographic randomness and context binding for values that authorize message handling.
  • Validate the sender, expected message relationship and permitted operation independently of rendering safety.
  • Keep externally supplied content inert and review embedded-browser permissions as a separate trust boundary.
  • Treat these as defensive design recommendations; the source dates a fix but does not establish the precise vendor patch implementation.

Award and evidence

USD 66,000Bug Bounty · Researcher Reported
How the award was verified, and what the record does not establish

One researcher-reported bug bounty, not an event total. The article uses $; prior official Meta program reporting supplies USD context. Actual cash settlement is not established.

  • Researcher-reported award; no independent vendor confirmation or audited transfer.
  • January 2026 page dates may reflect publication or archive migration; original disclosure is not established.
  • USD normalization uses earlier official program context rather than an award receipt.

Timeline

Reported
2023-06-22explicit
Awarded
2023-06-28explicit
Fixed
2023-12-15explicit · Researcher timeline explicitly labels this as the vendor fix date.

Related visual models

Related cases

All 11 cases in Authentication and identity

Sources

  1. Account Takeover in Facebook mobile app due to usage of cryptographically unsecure random number generator and XSS in Facebook JS SDKYoussef Sammouda · reviewed 2026-10-02
  2. Facebook Bug Bounty and BountyCon US-dollar reportingDan Gurfinkel / Facebook · reviewed 2026-10-02

Record reviewed 2026-10-02. Snapshot af2809c308fc. Open the complete JSON contract.

Library synced 2026-11-18 · cases last reviewed 2026-10-05

af2809c308fc · JSON exports & schemas · CC BY 4.0 content / MIT software