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SLSA v1.2: supply-chain security and build provenance

SLSA v1.2 defines separate assurance tracks for source code and builds. Its build track moves from recording how an artifact was produced to authenticated hosted builds and stronger isolation, helping consumers check the builder, inputs and build definition. Basic provenance alone does not prevent tampering; consumers still need a trusted verification process.

Open the referenceSecurity StandardReviewed 2026-10-02

How to use this reference

Map documented build controls and provenance expectations to an approved architecture review; distinguish attestation presence from trusted verification.

Before reading

  • Basic familiarity with version control and continuous integration
  • Understanding of software artifacts, hashes, and digital-signature concepts

Context and limits

  • Build L1 provenance alone does not provide tamper protection.
  • The specification version is 1.2, while the build-provenance predicate identifier remains https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1; the page explains this major-version convention.
  • A recorded attestation is useful only within an explicit trust and verification model.

Related visual models

Sources

  1. Official stable entry point redirects to v1.2SLSA Community · reviewed 2026-10-02
  2. Version 1.2 and Approved statusSLSA Community · reviewed 2026-10-02
  3. SLSA Community release announcement dated 24 November 2025SLSA Community · reviewed 2026-10-02
  4. Build-level distinctions and provenance limitationsSLSA Community · reviewed 2026-10-02
  5. Build provenance model and predicate-version conventionSLSA Community · reviewed 2026-10-02

Record reviewed 2026-10-02. Snapshot af2809c308fc. Open the complete JSON contract.

Library synced 2026-11-18 · cases last reviewed 2026-10-05

af2809c308fc · JSON exports & schemas · CC BY 4.0 content / MIT software